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Abstract
Transfers would play a key role in the implementation of Nationally Appropriate Mitiga-
tion Actions (NAMAs) in developing countries. In this paper, we analyze the desirable features
of such transfers - i.e., individually rational, budget-balanced, anti-incentives for free-riding
and misrepresentation. We model NAMAs as a non-cooperative, one shot game. We consider
NAMAs under two alternative transfer schemes: a horizontal equity-based transfer and an
“optimal” transfer scheme that we call à la Weikard. Our analysis is further refined by the
inclusion of the notion of pivotal countries. We find, firstly, that both transfer schemes may
allow the implementation of an individually rational and budget-balanced NAMAs portfo-
lio; secondly, that the transfer à la Weikard is more effective in avoiding free-riding. Thirdly,
both transfer schemes fail to avoid misrepresentation of costs and benefits from reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions. Finally, pivotal countries for NAMAs are the most interested in its
implementation even if they are the largest transfer contributors.
Keywords: Climate policy, Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions, Transfer schemes
1 Introduction
The most recent round of negotiations under the United Nation Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) gave birth to the Copenhagen Accord. One of the main points of this
document is to describe the expected role of Developing Countries (DCs) in the post-
2012 climate regime (UNFCCC, 2009). The accord mainly focuses on three points: i)
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions peaking, ii) mitigation commitments and iii) funding
and reporting. First, it recognizes that the time frame for GHG emissions peaking will
be longer in Non-Annex I countries, since they will prioritize economic development
and poverty eradication. Second, their mitigation efforts will be distinct from mitigation
commitments of developed countries (Annex I under the UNFCCC), both in magnitude
and in legal nature as stated in the Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC, 2007), since they will
undertake NAMAs. Finally, NAMAs seeking foreign funding have to be registered and
are subject to international Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV).
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Following Kaul et al. (2003), we may think of NAMAs as a case of a global public
good. The good would be the damages which are avoided by reducing GHG emissions.
Its public good nature stems from the fact that no country may be excluded from the
benefits of reducing GHG in any region of the planet. The adequate provision of this global
public good depends, to a large extent, on the transfer scheme used to provide it. Thus,
a key point for the functioning of NAMAs is the design of adequate transfers to allocate
funding among Non-Annex I countries. Furthermore, there are two other main issues in
NAMAs: (i) both the amount of the transfer and the envisaged level of mitigation efforts
are voluntary declarations for countries, and (ii) the implementation of both an MRV
system to corroborate financing and GHG reduction efforts may be a complex and not a
politically neutral task. Therefore, well-designed transfer schemes are needed, which self-
enforce the participation of countries, and thus improve the reduction of GHG emissions.
For the provision of a public good, the design of transfers has been essentially centered
on schemes which help to reveal the true valuation that agents have of the public good
(i.e., asymmetric information). One of the most important contributions in this field has
been provided by Myerson and Sattertwhaite (1983). They show that there is no transfer
scheme which simultaneously avoids asymmetric information:1 it is individually rational,
i.e., agents are not worse-off when participating; it is budget-balanced, i.e., total transfers
are not negative; and it allows the (efficient) provision of the public good.
Two well-known transfer schemes which avoid asymmetric information are the Clarke-
Groves (Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973) and the d’Aspremont-Gérard-Varet mechanisms
(d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet, 1979). Emons (1994) analyzes the provision of environ-
mental protection measures by means of these two mechanisms. He observes that Clarke-
Groves transfers are not budget-balanced, and that under the d’Aspremont-Gérard-Varet
transfers some agents are worse-off by participating. Miljkovic (2009) analyzes the provi-
sion of a global public good through the Clarke-Groves transfer. He corrects the budget-
balance problem by setting up some conditions (e.g., by allowing participation only to
countries with positive initial valuations on the public good). However, he determines that
if there are countries which are pivotal for the provision of the good, i.e. - the good is not
provided if they do not participate, then all the necessary conditions for such a mechanism
cannot be satisfied.
For the case of global climate policies, Rose et al. (1998) propose transfer schemes for
allocating GHG emission allowances among countries. More recently, Nagashima (2010)
summarizes, in-depth, the alternative transfers employed in the literature to tackle global
climate policies as well as the main results found due to their implementation, in particular
to avoid free-riding. The transfers may be in the form of side payments, emissions permit
trading or surplus sharing, and they have been mainly focused on one particular issue,
namely the curtailing of free-rider incentives.
In this paper, we analyze the desirable features of transfers for NAMAs - i.e., individ-
ually rational, budget-balanced, anti-incentives for free-riding and misrepresentation. We
model NAMAs as a non-cooperative, one shot game. Particularly, we analyze a NAMAs
portfolio under two alternative transfers: a horizontal equity-based and a so-called “opti-
mal” transfer which is a reformulation of a transfer proposed by Weikard (2009) which we
1A transfer scheme designed with the aim of avoiding asymmetric information is called mechanism by the literature
of mechanism design problems.
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call, hereafter, a transfer scheme à la Weikard. We think that these transfer schemes may
be considered for the implementation of NAMAs in a post-2012 global climate policy
since they include attractive ways to distribute surplus among countries to reduce GHG
emissions. On the one hand, the horizontal equity-based transfer allocates the surplus pay-
off following an egalitarian rule (i.e., every participating country receives the same final
payoff from avoiding climate change) and the transfer à la Weikard shares the surplus pay-
off in order to compensate the countries’ outside payoffs (i.e., when free-riding). Though
pursuing a similar objective, they differ in that the horizontal equity-based transfer, we
observe, is a pragmatic transfer in the sense that it is the simplest way to distribute the
surplus payof. On the other hand, the transfer à la Weikard is a more elaborate transfer
and it is considered as an “optimal sharing rule” in the sense that it minimizes incentives
to free-ride.
The main contributions of this paper are four: (i) we analyze NAMAs as a global
public good in a game theoretical framework; (ii) we identify countries’ behaviors (i.e.,
misrepresentation) and deviations from full cooperation (i.e., free-riding), (iii) we test for
transfers that may alleviate these problems, and (iv) we study the role of pivotal coun-
tries. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 analyzes the NAMAs
design problem; Section 3 examines the implementation of NAMAs by means of the hor-
izontal equity-based transfer and a transfer à la Weikard; Section 4 illustrates our results
via an illustrative example; and Section 5 draws some policy implications and concludes.
2 The NAMAs design problem
2.1 The model of a NAMAs portfolio: full cooperation
We propose to analyze a NAMAs portfolio as a contract among countries. We model
the negotiation of such a contract as a non-cooperative,2 one-shot game.3 The set of play-
ers are countries i = 1,2,3, . . . , I. which negotiate to participate in a NAMAs coalition.
A NAMAs coalition may be formed as long as the coalition includes both Annex I and
Non-Annex I countries. We refer to the case where all candidate countries sign the con-
tract as the grand coalition G. Countries negotiate to cooperate in implementing a NAMAs
portfolio for one economic sector or a nationwide program. The implementation of this
NAMAs portfolio means that each DCs may propose one NAMAs program (its strategy)
among a set of possible alternative programs. Note that in NAMAs, Annex I countries
do not carry out mitigation activities. Then, the NAMAs program proposed by country i
entails “national” (or sectoral) GHG emission reduction xi.
For simplicity, we assume that xi is the strategy of country i when it is called on to
play. The total GHG emission mitigation (i.e., coalitional target) from the implementation
of this NAMAs portfolio is given by XG = ∑Ii=1 xi. We further define the set of emissions
as ~XG = {x1, . . . ,xI.} with costs CG(~XG) = ∑Ii=1 ci(xi).4 We denote as S the volume of
GHG emissions before NAMAs and by S the final volume of GHG emissions after the
2Games may be also designed in a cooperative way. For an example of solution for the design of cooperative
environmental agreements, see for instance, Chander and Tulkens (1995).
3The model described in this section should be applied, in principle, to other types of situations than NAMAs. For
instance, in the design of a global climate policy centered on GHG mitigations.
4We consider that countries may propose “no-regret options” (i.e., mitigation opportunities with net negative costs).
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implementation of the NAMAs portfolio, so that XG = S−S.5 We consider that NAMAs
are implemented as a complement of a post-2012 global climate policy (e.g., at least
a Kyoto forever scenario). We assume that mitigation actions which are carried out by
Non-Annex I countries through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and financed
by the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) are not included in the NAMAs portfolio.6
Note that there is no burden-sharing rule to distribute GHG abatement among participating
Non-Annex I countries as NAMAs is a voluntary declaration for them.
We assume that countries are not identical. They differ in two parameters: abatement
costs and willingness to pay for the NAMAs portfolio. Developed countries do not incur
costs because they take part uniquely by financing NAMAs. Note that NAMAs portfolios
may not lead to Pareto optimal outcomes since all Non-Annex I countries are asked (as un-
der the Copenhagen accord) to carry out mitigation activities regardless of their marginal
abatement costs. Thus, countries may propose other xi different to their efficient solution,
i.e., where marginal costs and benefits from abatement are equal7. Countries reveal their
willingness to pay for the NAMAs portfolio θi(XG), which is increasing in XG. We as-
sume that this parameter is a direct measure of the damages Di(XG) which are avoided
by reducing XG. Country i perceives with the implementation of the NAMAs portfolio,
an environmental gain θi(XG) ≡ Di(S)−Di(S), with Di(S) as damages expected if the
NAMAs portfolio does not occur and Di(S) as damages expected if the NAMAs portfolio
occurs.8 Then, the total environmental gain from the implementation of the NAMAs port-
folio isΘG(XG) =∑Ii=1θi(XG), and~Θ(XG) = {θ1(XG), . . . ,θI(XG).}. We denote v̂i∈G(·) as
the initial payoff for country i and it is defined as follows: v̂i∈G(XG,xi) = θi(XG)− ci(xi).
We allow countries to make transfers ti ∈ ℜ among them. If ti > 0 country i contributes
with the financing of NAMAs programs abroad, otherwise it receives a subsidy to carry
out its NAMAs program. The sum of total transfers is denoted by T = ∑Ii=1 ti, with
~T = {t1, . . . , tI.}. Country i receives the following final payoff if it participates in the coali-
tion:
vi∈G(XG,xi, ti) = θi(XG)− ci(xi)− ti. (1)
Countries cooperate freely in the implementation of a NAMAs portfolio. We expect
that a minimum requirement for a country i to cooperate is that it receives, at least, an
equal final payoff than in the status quo.9 Thus, we state that cooperation must be individ-
These options have benefits such as reduced energy costs and reduced emissions of local/regional pollutants which
equal or exceed their costs to society, excluding the benefits of avoided climate change (IPCC, 2007). Bottom-up
studies suggest that mitigation opportunities with net negative costs have the potential to reduce emissions by about 6
GtCO2-eq/yr in 2030 (IPCC, 2007).
5We do not consider decay rate effects for these GHG emissions.
6The GEF supports projects in Non-Annex I countries that reduce or avoid GHG emissions in the areas of renewable
energy, energy efficiency, and sustainable transport.
7One rationale for our assumption is that, for instance, the level of GHG reduction targets agreed under the Kyoto
protocol was set up regardless of cost-benefit analysis. For a discussion on the cost inefficiency of targets under the
Kyoto protocol, see McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002).
8In this paper, we do not consider that countries could benefit from climate change (i.e., θi(XG) < 0). We base our
assumption on the fact that NAMAs is a policy instrument focused on Non-Annex I countries and that the impact of
climate change on these countries is expected to be negative, particularly larger than that for developed countries for 4◦
of warming (IPCC, 2007).
9We define as status quo, the case where there is not abatement reduction at all due to the implementation of a
NAMAs portfolio, that is θi(0) = 0.
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ually rational and the following condition be upheld:
(i) The final payoff of every country is non-negative: vi∈G(XG,xi, ti)≥ 0,∀i.
We assume that there is no source of funds (beyond countries’ transfers) to finance a
NAMAs portfolio. One rationale for that is the current scarcity of international funds to
provide a global public good. Therefore, we consider that a NAMAs portfolio is budget-
balanced if the following condition is satisfied:
(ii) Total transfers are not negative: T ≥ 0 .
In addition, we consider that a necessary requisite for the implementation of a NAMAs
portfolio is the following feasibility condition:
(iii) The total environmental gain equals or exceeds total cost: ΘG(XG)≥CG(~XG).
We comprehend (iii) from the efficient provision decision rule of a discrete public good
stated firstly by Samuelson (1954). There, the public good should be provided if the sum
of consumers’ reservation prices exceeds the cost of providing the public good, otherwise
the status quo should be kept. In our analysis, the public good (i.e., avoided impacts from
reduction in GHG emissions) may be considered as a continuous public good since the
total GHG mitigation potential ~XG depends on how many countries i take part in coalition
G. Note that (i) and (ii) entail (iii). By (i), we obtain the result that vi∈G(XG,xi, ti) ≥ 0,
then ∑Ii=1 vi∈G(XG,xi, ti)≥ 0 which is the same as ΘG(XG)−CG(~XG)−T ≥ 0; and by (ii),
T ≥ 0, then necessarily ΘG(XG)−CG(~XG)≥ 0.
Definition 1. A NAMAs coalition G is individually rational, balanced and feasible if there
is, at least, one set {~X ,~T} that meets conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) ∀i ∈ G.
We found, in the literature, that the existence is possible of pivotal agents for the
provision of a public good (Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973). More recently, Miljkovic (2009)
again takes up this concept for the case of the provision of a global public good. He
glimpses the possible presence of pivotal countries within international organizations. We
consider it useful to study the role of pivotal countries in the implementation of NAMAs.
Let ΘG− j(XG− j) and CG− j(~XG− j) , be the total willingness to pay and the total cost
of coalition G without country j, respectively, with XG− j = XG− x j and CG− j(~XG− j) =
CG(~XG)− c j(x j) and ΘG− j(XG− j) = ∑Ii=1θi/∈ j(XG− j).10
Definition 2. Assume that the grand coalition G is formed and that (iii) holds. Then, j is a
pivotal country if when j withdraws from G, (iii) does not hold anymore (pivotal effect):11
ΘG− j(XG− j)−CG− j(~XG− j)< 0. (2)
10Thereafter, we denote as j a country which is the only one having a different behavior compared to the other
countries i ∈ G.
11This condition may not be associated with the non-essentiality definition of Weikard (2009). There, a player j is
non-essential for a coalition if, whether j takes part or not in the coalition, no country has an incentive to withdraw from
the coalition. Following our pivotal definition, it should be the case that a non-pivotal country might be essential or not
essential for the coalition.
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A pivotal country is necessarily one for which θ j(XG) >> c j(x j). Note that country
j may be both an Annex I country or a DCs - e.g., Annex I countries with high benefits
from avoiding GHG emissions and Non-Annex I countries with low marginal abatement
costs and high benefits. For the purposes of this paper, we classify the national NAMAs
programs, as described in the Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009), into two categories:
(i) unilateral NAMAs that are self-financed actions undertaken by Non-Annex I countries,
and (ii) supported NAMAs that are programs which need some monetary transfer from
developed countries.
2.2 Countries’ behaviors and deviations from full cooperation
Unfortunately, finding a set {~X ,~T} that meets (i) to (iii) is not enough to guarantee
that countries will fully cooperate when implementing a NAMAs. There are some issues
such as free-riding and asymmetric information that may still doom to failure the imple-
mentation of a NAMAs portfolio as in definition (1). In the following, we analyze how
these issues may act under a NAMAs portfolio and we propose some conditions which
help in dealing with them.
2.2.1 Anti-free-rider incentives
Cooperation on GHG mitigation is plagued by free-riding since the output of mitiga-
tion activities can be viewed as a global public good.12 Therefore, it would be expected
that NAMAs will have to deal with this problem. As participation of Non-Annex I coun-
tries is voluntary, they should base their decision to participate in NAMAs on their payoffs
when participating in coalition G (i.e., equation 1) and when remaining outside and enjoy-
ing the benefits of the avoided GHG mitigation efforts made by the other countries (i.e.,
free-riding). In the free-riding case, equation (1) becomes:
v j/∈G(XG− j,0,0) = θ j(XG− j). (3)
Note that the outside payoff θ j(XG− j) of a country j when it is pivotal for the imple-
mentation of a NAMAs portfolio is zero since XG− j = 0. We introduce the no-free-rider
incentive condition into the analysis by substituting (3) in (i). Then, we state the following:
(iv) No country is better-off when free-riding: v j∈G(XG,x j, t j)≥ θ j(XG− j),∀ j.
Note that (iv) is a stricter version of (i). If there is a coalition G that holds with (iv) for
all countries, then coalition G is internally stable (hereafter stable) - i.e. no country has
an incentive to withdraw from the coalition.13 In consequence, the coalition G constitutes
12For a game theoretical survey of this problem in international cooperation on climate change agreements, see for
instance Böhringer et al. (2002). For some policy implications related to free-riding in climate change negotiations see
Banuri et al. (2001).
13In this paper, we only search for internally stable coalitions as G is the grand coalition. However, in related studies,
the externally stable concept is also employed: a coalition is externally stable if no non-participating country has an
incentive to joint the coalition (d’Aspremont et al., 1983; Nagashima et al., 2009).
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a Nash equilibrium and the NAMAs portfolio is self-enforcing.14 We have two situations
when analyzing anti free-rider incentives: one for pivotal countries and other for non-
pivotal countries.
Proposition 1. If (i) to (iii) are fulfilled, and j is pivotal, then (iv) always holds for country
j.
Proof. If country j is a pivotal DCs, and it leaves the coalition G, then the NAMAs port-
folio is not implemented at all and its final payoff from free-riding is zero, and by (i)
v j∈G(XG,x j, t j)
≥ 0, (iv) (weakly) holds and j has no incentives to free-ride.
Proposition 1 implies that (i) is necessary and sufficient for pivotal countries. However,
if j is a non-pivotal DCs, j decides to take part in the coalition if and only if it satisfies
(iv). Therefore, if we have a feasible set {~X ,~T} which holds with (ii) and (iv) for all
i, then coalition G is balanced, individually rational, avoids free-rider incentives and by
consequence is efficient at providing the public good - i.e., XG is provided.
If (iv) does not hold for a non-pivotal country j, the Nash equilibrium is that j free-
rides and the NAMAs portfolio is carried out by coalition G− j. This result is in line
with that found by Nagashima et al. (2009). They study the impact of transfer on the
incentives for regions to join international climate agreements. They find that no transfer
is capable of stabilizing the participation of all countries, but an optimal sharing surplus
rule proposed by Weikard (2009) allows the formation of larger stable coalitions which
include key players. Therefore, in section 3, we test the transfer à la Weikard to the case
of NAMAs.
2.2.2 Asymmetric information
Asymmetric informational problems have been reported in the contract design of pay-
ments for environmental services (Ferraro, 2008). There are two important information
asymmetries in the design of contracts: hidden information (i.e., adverse selection) and
hidden action (i.e., moral hazard).15 Labbate (2008) analyzes adverse selection problems
in the application of the Incremental Costs (IC) principle for the conservation of global
habitats by the GEF.16 As the calculation of the IC requires the estimation of benefits and
costs in two distinct scenarios (baseline and counterfactual), there are incentives to the
recipient countries to misrepresent their costs and benefits from the project, and therefore
receive higher IC transfers.
For the case of global climate policy, asymmetric informational problems have been
studied in joint implementation (Hagem, 1996) and CDM projects (Millock, 2002). Hagem
(1996) considers that countries may have two kinds of private information on efficiency,
and on actions taken during the project period. Millock (2002) considers that Non-Annex
14We do not consider (iv) for developed countries as their participation is mandatory in NAMAs.
15For a comprehensive theoretical framework on asymmetric information, see, for example, Bolton and Dewatripont
(2005).
16IC is the extra cost that a country incurs when contributing to a global public good in an amount greater than it
would have contributed if it had been guided solely by criteria of national interest. The country that undertakes the extra
effort receives a compensation payment (King, 2006).
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I countries possess private information on a technical efficiency parameter (i.e., they may
exaggerate their emission reduction costs in order to receive a larger transfer).
In this context, for the case of NAMAs, the initial payoff of countries v̂ j∈G may not
be observable or available public information since each country should know their costs
better than the others c j(x j) and benefits θ j(XG) associated with the implementation of a
NAMAs portfolio. Then, countries may misrepresent their types by either overestimating
costs c˜ j(x j) or underestimating benefits θ˜ j(XG), and in consequence they may get an
“informational rent”. Thus, we state the following incentive compatibility condition for
NAMAs:
(v) No country misrepresents its type if: v j∈G(XG,x j, t j)≥ v j∈G(XG,x j, t˜ j)∀ j.
With some abuse of the notation in (v), we let t˜ j be the transfer that country j makes
when it announces either θ˜ j(XG) or c˜ j(x j).
Finally, an ideal contract for the implementation of a NAMAs portfolio has to guar-
antee five requirements: it is individually rational, condition (i); it is budget-balanced,
condition (ii); it is feasible, condition (iii); it avoids free-riding, condition (iv); and it is
incentive compatible, condition (v). An important role in such a contract is played by the
transfer schemes employed to implement the NAMAs portfolio. Therefore, we focus in
the next section on transfer schemes for NAMAs.
3 Transfer schemes for NAMAs
Transfers have recently attracted the attention of the literature on global climate agree-
ments since they are seen as efficient instruments to target climate change directly. They
have been mainly associated with the flow of resources from developed countries to DCs
(Frankel, 2007; Höhne et al., 2006; Reinstein, 2004; Sugiyama and Sinton, 2005). Rose
et al. (1998) investigate the impact of transfers for allocating emissions permits. They clas-
sify transfers into two types: allocation-based rules, i.e., permits are initially distributed
among countries according to certain criteria, and outcome-based rules, i.e., net bene-
fits from cooperative abatement efforts are distributed among countries based on certain
criteria. More recently, Nagashima (2010) summarizes, in-depth, the alternative transfers
employed in the literature to tackle global climate policies as well as the main results
found due to their implementation. She points out that the design and analysis of trans-
fers among countries in the form of side payments, emissions permit trading or surplus
sharing has been mainly focused on one particular issue, namely the curtailing of free-
rider incentives. For our analysis, we consider it appropriate to state the following set of
definitions.
Definition 3. A transfer for NAMAs ti(XG,xi) is a sharing rule of distributing the total
initial payoff ∑Ii=1 v̂i∈G(XG,xi) of countries i ∈ G such that conditions (i) and (ii) are
fulfilled.
Definition 4. The transfer ti(XG,xi) provides an anti-free-rider incentive and it is consid-
ered as efficient if it allows (iv) to be fulfilled ∀i ∈ G, in consequence ~XG is reached.
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A transfer that deals with asymmetric informational problems is considered as a mech-
anism by the literature of mechanism design problem (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). Therefore,
in order to continue with this well-established definition, we consider it necessary to make
the difference between a transfer and a mechanism.
Definition 5. A transfer for NAMAs ti(XG,xi) is a mechanism if and only if it is efficient
and it allows (v) to be fulfilled.
Definition 5 states, then, that the main goal of a mechanism is to deal with asymmetric
information. A mechanism may be viewed as an institution or a center which governs the
procedure for making the collective choice. This center is completely informed about the
type that each country is and it has the possibility to “arrange” the game so that countries
receive the best final payoff when telling the truth.
Armed with these definitions, an ideal transfer for NAMAs would be a mechanism that
meets conditions (i) to (v). However, we know by the Myerson-Sattertwhaite impossibil-
ity theorem (Myerson and Sattertwhaite, 1983) that, in general, there is not a mechanism
that is individually rational, condition (i); it is budget-balanced, condition (ii); it makes
possible the provision of a public good, condition (iii); and it avoids misrepresentation,
condition (v) when participation is voluntary. Moreover, Emons (1994) shows, for ex-
ample, that the set of conditions (i) to (iii) do not always hold simultaneously for the
well-known mechanisms employed for the provision of a public good under private in-
formation, namely, the Clarke-Groves and the d’Aspremont-Gérard-Varet mechanisms.
He observes that Clarke-Groves transfers are not budget-balanced (i.e., the sum of trans-
fers is negative). This failure may be avoided by the d’Aspremont-Gérard-Varet transfer;
however, in this one, participation of some agents may not be individually rational.
Transfers under the Clarke-Groves mechanism depend on the effect that countries im-
pose on the coalition with its participation (Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973). For the case of a
NAMAs portfolio, the Clarke-Groves mechanism may be stated as tCGi (·) =∑Ij=1, j 6=i v̂ j∈G
(XG−i,x j)−∑Ij=1, j 6=i v̂ j∈G(XG,x j). Looking on the right-hand side, the first term repre-
sents the effect that country i imposes to all other countries in the coalition when it does
not participate, and the second term is the effect that i imposes to all other countries with
its participation. Under this transfer scheme, i’s transfer is zero if when it reveals its type,
it does not change the decision of providing the public good (e.g., NAMAs). Otherwise, it
receives a transfer, and in that case i is pivotal for the provision of the public good. Thus,
the sum of transfers is obviously negative. Several studies have shown that the Clarke-
Groves mechanism is not budget-balanced, see for instance, Emons (1994). As a result, it
is not a transfer for NAMAs, as we state in definition 3.
Under the d’Aspremont-Gérard-Varet mechanism, a country’s transfer is based on the
expected value of the other countries’ initial payoffs depending on its own (d’Aspremont
and Gérard-Varet, 1979). It may be denoted for NAMAs as tAGVi (·) = ξi
[˜̂vi(·), v̂ j(·)]−
1
(I−1)∑
I
j=1 ξ j 6=i
[˜̂v j(·), v̂i(·)].17 This mechanism assumes that the parameter containing pri-
vate information, in our case v̂i(·) is not known by country i before participation. Looking
on the right hand side, the first term represents the sum of j’s expected payoff when coun-
try i announces a ˜̂vi(·); and the second term is a contribution that country i makes to each
17ξi is an expectational term. For a mathematical explanation of its meaning, see Mas-Colell et al. (1995), page 886.
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other I− i country when it states the truth.
This mechanism is budget-balanced since ∑Ii=1 tAGVi (·) = ∑Ii=1 ξi [·]− 1(I−1)∑Ii=1(I−
1)ξi [·] = 0. However, under this mechanism, it is possible that some countries have to
pay a tAGVi > v̂i(·). Thus, if these countries know in advance their types v̂i(·) but they do
not know the other agents’ types, they will not have an incentive to participate when they
are obligated to state the truth, since substituting the d’Aspremont-Gérard-Varet transfer
in (1), we conclude by condition (i), vi(XG,xi, tAGVi )< 0. Thus, the d’Aspremont-Gérard-
Varet is not a transfer for NAMAs, as we state in definition 3.
We have just shown that even when condition (iii) holds, conditions (i) and (ii) are
not necessarily fulfilled. Therefore, as these time-honored mechanisms employed for the
provision of a public good do not meet the minimal requirements for the implementation
of a NAMAs portfolio, we restrict thereafter our attention only to transfers that meet
definition 3. Then, we check their efficiency in the provision of NAMAs (definition 4) to
see whether they could be employed as mechanisms (definition 5). We particularly analyze
NAMAs under two alternative transfers: a horizontal equity-based transfer and a transfer
à la Weikard. Although both transfers are of the type of surplus sharing, they differ in that
the horizontal equity-based transfer distributes the surplus payoff following an egalitarian
rule (i.e., every participating country receives the same final payoff from avoiding GHG
emissions); and the transfer à la Weikard shares the surplus payoff in order to compensate
the countries’ outside payoffs (i.e., when free-riding). Furthermore, they differ in that the
horizontal equity-based transfer is a pragmatic transfer in the sense that it is the simplest
way to distribute the surplus payoff, whereas the transfer à la Weikard is a more elaborated
transfer and it is considered to be an “optimal sharing rule”.
3.1 A horizontal equity-based transfer scheme
We propose the following horizontal equity-based transfer scheme for NAMAs:
tHi (XG,xi) = v̂i∈G(XG,xi)−
∑Ij=1 v̂ j∈G(XG,x j)
I
. (4)
This transfer follows a distribution rule for the surplus payoff that allows all partici-
pating countries to receive an equalized final payoff. This horizontal equity-based transfer
follows the idea of the horizontal outcome-based equity criterion for global climate policy
described by Rose et al. (1998). They define this criterion for the distribution of tradable
CO2 emission permits, where all countries are treated equally. Its main operational rule is
to equalize net welfare change across nations.
Proposition 2. If (iii) holds and ~T follows (4), then (ii) and (i) also hold.
Proof. For (ii), substituting (4) in (ii), we see:
∑Ii=1 tHi (XG,xi) = ∑
I
i=1
[
v̂i∈G(XG,xi)− ∑
I
j=1 v̂ j∈G(XG,x j)
I
]
= 0.
For (i), the final payoff of country i when it takes part in the grand coalition G may be
calculated substituting (4) in (1). That is:
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vi∈G(XG,xi, tHi ) =
∑Ii=1 v̂i∈G(XG,xi)
I =
ΘG(XG)−CG(~XG)
I ≥ 0, by (iii).
We analyze free-rider incentives under this horizontal equity-based transfer (4) for
a non-pivotal country j when conditions (i) to (iii) hold. Substituting (4) in (1), we can
rewrite (iv) as follows:
ΘG(XG)−CG(~XG)
I
≥ θ j(XG− j). (5)
From (5) we state that a non-pivotal country j which receives lower environmental
gains from the mitigation of other coalition members than the average initial payoffs has
an incentive to remain in the grand coalition. Otherwise, j free-rides and coalition G− j
is formed.
Now consider misrepresentation incentives for country j. As analyzed in section 2.2.2,
countries may misrepresent v̂ j∈G(XG,x j). Then, if country j overestimates mitigation
costs by announcing a c˜ j(x j)> c j(x j), then (4) becomes:
t˜Hj (XG,x j) = θ j(XG)− c˜ j(x j)−
ΘG(XG)−CG− j(~XG− j)− c˜ j(xi)
I
. (6)
We find, by rewriting (v), that this country will not have incentives to misrepresent
its type if v j∈G(XG,x j, tHj )− v j∈G(XG,x j, t˜Hj ) ≥ 0. We rewrite the final payoff of country
j if it tells the truth as ΘG(XG)−CG− j(
~XG− j)−c j(x j)
I (see proof of proposition 2); and by sub-
stituting (6) in (1), we find that the final payoff of country j when it announces c˜ j(x j)
is c˜ j(x j)− c j(x j)+ ΘG(XG)−CG− j(~XG− j)−c˜ j(x j)I . Then, v j∈G(XG,x j, tHj )− v j∈G(XG,x j, t˜Hj ) =[
c˜ j(x j)− c j(x j)
] 1−I
I < 0. As a result, country j has an interest to overstate its mitigation
costs.
The same analysis may be done when j understates its benefits by announcing θ˜i(XG)<
θi(XG). There, (4) becomes:
t˜Hj (XG,x j) = θ˜ j(XG)− c j(x j)−
ΘG− j(XG)+ θ˜ j(XG)−CG(~XG)
I
. (7)
We rewrite the final payoff of country j when stating the truth as ΘG− j(XG)+θ j(XG)−CG(
~XG)
I .
Substituting (7) in (1), we find that the final payoff of country j when misrepresenting its
environmental gain is θ j(XG)− θ˜ j(XG)+ ΘG− j(XG)+θ˜ j(XG)−CG(
~XG)
I . Then:
v j∈G(XG,x j, tHj )− v j∈G(XG,x j, t˜Hi ) =
θ j(XG)− θ˜ j(XG)
I
−θ j(XG)+ θ˜ j(XG)
=
1− I
I
[
θ j(XG)− θ˜ j(XG)
]
< 0.
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Again, country j gains from misreporting its type.
In summary, the horizontal equity-based transfer scheme is individually rational and
balanced. However, it does not avoid free-riding for all types of countries, preventing the
formation of the grand coalition and in consequence not reaching the coalitional target XG.
Thus, it is not efficient. Moreover, it is not incentive compatible, since coalition members
are better-off either over-reporting their mitigation costs or understating their environmen-
tal benefits, and as a result it may not be considered as a mechanism (definition 5).
3.2 An “optimal” transfer scheme à la Weikard
Nagashima et al. (2009) found that an optimal sharing surplus transfer was the best
at avoiding free-rider incentives and stabilizing climate coalitions. Optimal sharing sur-
plus transfers have been suggested by Carraro et al. (2006); McGinty (2007); Weikard
(2009); Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2010). In this paper, we consider the implementa-
tion of NAMAs based on Weikard (2009). Thus, we establish the following transfer à la
Weikard:18
tWj (XG,x j) = v̂ j∈G(XG,x j)−
θ j(XG− j)
∑Ik=1θk(XG−k)
×
I
∑
i=1
v̂i∈G(XG,xi). (8)
Weikard (2009) proposes to share the surplus payoff following a rule where the coali-
tion surplus is distributed proportional to outside option payoffs (See equation 3). The
term ∑Ik=1θk(XG−k) is the total of outside option payoffs. Weikard transfers more benefit
to countries with the highest outside option payoff.
Proposition 3. If (iii) holds and ~T follows (8), then (ii) and (i) also hold.
Proof. For (ii), substituting (8) in (ii), we see:
I
∑
j=1
tWj (XG,x j) =
I
∑
j=1
[
v̂ j∈G(XG,x j)− θ j(XG− j)
∑Ik=1θk(XG−k)
×
I
∑
i=1
v̂i∈G(XG,xi)
]
=
I
∑
i=1
v̂i∈G(XG,xi)−
∑Ij=1θ j(XG− j)
∑Ik=1θk(XG−k)
×
I
∑
i=1
v̂i∈G(XG,xi) = 0.
For (i), the final payoff of country j when it takes part in the grand coalition G may be
calculated substituting (8) in (1):
18We have changed the order of terms in the original formula with the aim of aligning it with the meaning of the sign
we employ in our model: ti(·)> 0, country i contributes to finance NAMAs abroad, otherwise it is a transfer recipient.
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v j(XG,x j, tWj ) = v̂ j∈G(XG,x j)− tWj (XG,XG− j,x j)
=
I
∑
i=1
v̂i∈G(XG,xi)× θ j(XG− j)
∑Ik=1θk(XG−k)
=
[
Θ(XG)−CG(~XG)
]
× θ j(XG− j)
∑Ik=1θk(XG−k)
≥ 0.
If ΘG(XG) = CG(~XG), then v j(XG,x j, tWj ) = 0. For the case when ΘG(XG) > CG(~XG);
pivotal countries have θ j(XG− j) = 0, by proposition 1, and they then receive a final payoff
v j(XG,x j, tWj ) = 0; and non-pivotal countries receive v j(XG,x j, t
W
j ) > 0 as a final payoff.
Now consider free-rider incentives for non-pivotal countries under the transfer à la
Weikard. We can rewrite (iv), by substituting (8) in (1), as follows:
[
ΘG(XG)−C(~XG)
]
× θ j(XG− j)
∑Ik=1θk(XG−k)
≥ θ j(XG− j), (9)
which is the same as:
ΘG(XG)−C(~XG)≥
I
∑
k=1
θk(XG−k). (10)
As proved above, if (ii) holds for (8), then pivotal countries pay a transfer equivalent
to tWj (XG,x j) = v̂ j∈G(XG,x j), and all surplus payoff, if any, is allocated to non-pivotal
countries. From (9) or (10), we conclude that when the surplus payoff exceeds or equals
the total of outside option payoffs of non-pivotal countries, no non-pivotal country k has an
incentive to free-ride, and the grand coalition formed is stable. When (10) holds, Weikard
(2009) states that the coalition G is potentially self-enforcing (stable).
We analyze whether when G is formed with transfers à la Weikard, signatory coun-
tries would have incentives to misrepresent their types. They can do this by overstating
their mitigation costs or understimating their environmental gains. For notational ease,
we define b j =
(
θ j(XG− j)
∑Ik=1 θk(XG−k)
)
. Country j would misrepresent its type by, for instance,
over-reporting its mitigation costs c˜ j(x j)> c j(x j),19 then (8) becomes:
t˜Wj (XG,x j) = θ j(XG)− c˜ j(x j)−
[
ΘG(XG)−CG− j(~XG− j)− c˜ j(x j)
]
b j. (11)
Substituting (11) in (1), we find that the final payoff of country j when over-reporting
its mitigation costs is c˜ j(x j)− c j(x j) + b j
[
ΘG(XG)−CG− j(~XG− j)− c˜ j(x j)
]
. Then, the
incentive compatibility condition (v) does not hold as v j∈G(XG,x j, tWj )− v j∈G
19We do not analyze c˜ j(x j) if j is a developed country since it does not incur any mitigation costs.
13
(XG,x j, t˜Wj ) =
[
c j(x j)− c˜ j(x j)
]
(1− b j) < 0. Note that 0 ≤ b j ≤ 1. If b j = 0, then j is
pivotal and if b j = 1, then there is only one country and it is non-pivotal. Therefore,
country j has an interest to overstate its mitigation costs.
When country j under-reports its environmental gain θ˜ j(XG)< θ j(XG), (8) becomes:20
t˜Wj (XG,x j) = θ˜ j(XG)− c j(x j)−
[
ΘG− j(XG)+ θ˜ j(XG)−CG(~XG)
]
b j. (12)
Substituting (12) in (1), we deduce that the final payoff of country j when it announces
θ˜ j(XG) is θ j(XG)− θ˜ j(XG)+
[
ΘG− j(XG)+ θ˜ j(XG)−CG(~XG)
]
b j. Then, the incentive com-
patibility condition (v) does not hold as v j∈G(XG,x j, tWj )− v j∈G(XG,x j, t˜Wj )
=
[
θ˜ j(XG)−θ j(XG)
]
(1−b j)< 0. Once more, country j gains from misreporting.
In conclusion, the transfer scheme à la Weikard is balanced, individually rational and
allows the formation of the grand coalition if the surplus payoff covers the total of outside
option payoffs of non-pivotal countries. Thus, it is efficient at providing the public good,
XG. However it is not incentive compatible because countries may misrepresent their true
types; consequently it may not be defined as a mechanism (definition 5).
4 NAMAs under an illustrative example
In this section, we describe NAMAs through an illustrative example. We analyze the
case of full cooperation as well as free-riding and misrepresentation problems for both
the horizontal equity-based and the transfer à la Weikard. Consider the negotiation of
a NAMAs portfolio by four countries I = {A,B,C,D}. Country A is a developed coun-
try. Countries B,C and D are Non-Annex I countries. They are different in three points,
namely: the income measured through the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)i, GHG emis-
sion reduction xi, and marginal abatement costs c′i of reducing GHG emissions. Countries
have linear abatement costs, so that ci(xi) = c′ixi. We assume that the following inequali-
ties hold for these Non-Annex I countries: GDPA > GDPB > GDPC > GDPD,xB > xC >
xD, and c′B < c′C < c′D. For simplicity, we consider that the GHG emission reduction
target is XG = 20 units, with XG = xb+ xc+ xd .
We estimate damages which are avoided by reducing these 20 units as an arbitrary pro-
portion of GDPi, i.e., θi(XG) = θi(20) = 19GDPi. As θi is increasing in X , then θi(XG)>
θi(XG−c) > θi(XG−d), where XG−i = XG− xi for i = C,D. Let us choose a set {~X ,~T}
which satisfies these properties: (a) that condition (iii) holds; (b) that country B carries
out a unilateral NAMAs program as θi(X) > ci(xi); (c) that country C undertakes a par-
tially supported NAMAs as θi(X) < ci(xi); (d) that country D embarks on a quasi fully
supported NAMAs as θi(X) << ci(xi); and (e) that countries A & B are pivotal. Table
1 shows a set of values (xi,GDPi,c′i) that satisfy all these assumptions. Remember that
v̂i(XG,xi) = θi(XG)− ci(xi), and it is the initial payoff of country i.
20In this study, we do not consider the possibility that country j does misrepresent its type θ j(XG− j).
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Table 1: Data for the illustrative example.
a
Parameter Country A Country B Country C Country D Total
GDPi 320.00 225.00 45.00 5.00 595.00
xi b 10.44 8.00 1.55 20.00
c′i b 2.00 4.00 6.00 -
ci(xi) b 20.88 32.00 9.33 62.22
θi(XG) 35.55 25.00 5.00 0.55 66.11
v̂i(XG,xi) 35.55 4.12 -27.00 -8.78 3.89
θi(XG−c)
c
18.82 13.24 2.65 0.29 32.35
θi(XG−d)
d
33.68 23.68 4.74 0.53 62.11
Notes:
a All figures are given in the same numeration (u).
b As country A is a developed country, these values are not needed for our
calculation.
c We assign θi(12) = (1/17)GDPi.
d We assign θi(18.44) = (1/9.5)GDPi.
4.1 The horizontal equity-based transfer scheme
We apply to this feasible set the horizontal equity-based transfer. Table 2 shows the
results for full cooperation, free-riding and misrepresentation that we analyze in section
3.1. Note that proposition 2 holds since the total sum of transfers is zero (ii), and that
transfers guarantee that every country receives a positive final payoff (i). The surplus
payoff is distributed in an egalitarian way. Countries A & B pay for NAMAs in other
countries, whereas countries C & D receive transfers to undertake their NAMAs.
When we consider anti free-rider incentives, we have the following results: (a) that
pivotal countries A & B do not have incentives to free-ride as their outside payoffs are zero
(proposition 1); (b) that coalition G formed by the four countries is not internally stable,
as country C is better-off outside; (c) that the only stable coalition is that which is formed
by countries A, B & D because no-country (i.e., A, B & D) is better-off outside (internal
stability), and no outside country (i.e., C) is better-off rejoining the coalition (external
stability). Remember that for non-pivotal countries (iv) is ∑
I
i=1 v̂i(XG,xi)
I = 0.97≥ θ j(XG− j).
In this example the only country with an outside payoff greater than the average initial
payoff is country C, that is θc(XG−c) = 2.64 > 0.97.
We retain the stable coalition G∗ = {A,B,D}. Its payoffs and transfer schemes are
those of the second set in table 2. We analyze misrepresentation of mitigation costs and
the willingness to pay parameters for countries belonging to the stable coalition when they
announce a c˜ j(x j) > c j(x j) or a θ˜ j(XG∗) < θ j(XG∗). We conclude that they always have
incentives to deviate from the truth when the other countries state the truth. Finally, the
best outcome of the game under the horizontal equity-based transfer is a Nash equilibrium
characterized by this: countries A, B & D embark in a NAMAs coalition (i.e., they sign
the NAMAs contract), and every country is better-off if country C remains as a free-rider.
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Table 2: Horizontal equity-based transfer applied to illustrative example.
a
Parameter Country A Country B Country C Country D Total
Full cooperation
ti(XG,xi) 34.58 3.14 -27.97 -9.75 0.00
vi∈G(XG,xi, ti) 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 3.89
Country C free-rides, XG−c = 12.00
ti(XG−c,xi) 18.11 -8.36 - -9.75 0.00
vi∈G(XG−c,xi, ti) 0.71 0.71 (2.65)
b
0.71 2.13
Country D free-rides, XG−d = 18.44
ti(XG−d ,xi) 30.61 -0.28 -30.34 - 0.00
vi∈G(XG−d ,xi, ti) 3.07 3.07 3.07 (0.52)
b
9.22
Country D leaves the coalition G∗, XG∗ = 10.44
c
θi(XG∗ ,xi) 17.78 12.50 - 0.28
c
30.27
ti(XG∗ ,xi) 14.55 -11.61 - 0.00 0.00
vi∈G(XG∗ ,xi, ti) 3.22 3.22 - (0.28)
b
6.44
Country A announces θ˜A(XG∗) = 18.00
ti(XG−c,xi) (17.56)
d
-8.09 - -9.47 0.00
vi∈G
[
(XG−c,xi, ti), t˜A
]
1.26 0.44 - 0.44 2.13
Country B announces θ˜B(XG∗) = 13.00
ti(XG−c,xi) 18.19 (-8.52)
f
- -9.67 0.00
vi∈G
[
(XG−c,xi, ti), t˜B
]
0.63 0.87 - 0.63 2.13
Country B announces c˜B(xB) = 22.00
ti(XG−c,xi) 18.48 -9.10 - -9.38 0.00
vi∈G
[
(XG−c,xi, ti), t˜B
]
0.34 1.45 - 0.34 2.13
Country D announces θ˜D(XG∗) = 0.10
ti(XG−c,xi) 18.18 -8.30 - (-9.88)
d
0.00
vi∈G
[
(XG−c,xi, ti), t˜D
]
0.65 0.65 - 0.84 2.13
Country D announces c˜D(xD) = 10.00
ti(XG−c,xi) 18.34 -8.14 - -10.19 0.00
vi∈G
[
(XG−c,xi, ti), t˜D
]
0.49 0.49 - 1.15 2.13
Notes:
a All figures are given in the same numeration (u).
b These values are not included in the total column. Furthermore, they correspond to
θi(XG−i).
c We assign θi(10.44) = (1/18)GDPi.
d This value corresponds to t˜i(XG∗ ,xi).
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4.2 The transfer à la Weikard
In this section, we apply the transfer à la Weikard to the feasible set {~X ,~T} presented
in table 1. Table 3 shows the results for full cooperation, free-riding and misrepresentation
which we analyze in section 3.2. Proposition 3 holds since this transfer always allows the
implementation of a budget-balanced NAMAs portfolio (ii) and countries receive zero or
positive payoffs (i). Note that the surplus payoff is the same as under the horizontal equity-
based transfer. However, transfers à la Weikard redistribute initial payoffs of countries to
those countries which have the higher outside payoffs, the non-pivotal countries C & D.
All transfers paid by pivotal countries are allocated to non-pivotal countries. As a result,
pivotal countries receive zero as their final payoff. We discover that the NAMAs coalition
G formed by all countries is stable (i.e., the grand coalition). No country has an incentive
to leave.21 This result shows that this transfer scheme is better than the horizontal equity-
based transfer scheme. However, as for the horizontal equity-based transfer scheme, every
country is better-off misrepresenting its type, either underestimating its environmental
gain or over-reporting its mitigation costs.
5 Policy implications and concluding remarks
In this paper, we envisage the implementation of a NAMAs portfolio by means of two
transfer schemes: a horizontal equity-based and an “optimal” transfer which we call à
la Weikard. We model NAMAs as a non-cooperative, one shot game. We then find the
following results.
First, these transfer schemes may allow the implementation of a NAMAs coalition
which is balanced and individually rational. That is, if NAMAs occur, then these transfer
schemes ensure that no country will receive a negative final payoff and that the sum of
transfers among countries is zero. The latter feature guarantees that there is no need for
external source of funds to finance NAMAs. Therefore, these transfers make of NAMAs
a “self-financing” climate policy instrument.
Secondly, concerning free-rider incentives, we have two main findings. On the one
hand, NAMAs is “self-enforcing” for countries which are pivotal for the NAMAs portfo-
lio regardless of the transfer scheme employed. This result entails one main policy impli-
cation: if the definition of a pivotal country is taken into account in the design of NAMAs,
then pivotal countries are the most interested in the realization of NAMAs, even if they
pay the highest transfers. Thus, “no-action” is not a credible threat for pivotal countries,
as would usually be thought. Nevertheless, we consider that more research has to be un-
dertaken to elucidate the role of pivotal countries in global climate policies. On the other
hand, the transfer à la Weikard allows the implementation of a self-enforcing NAMAs
coalition, also for all non-pivotal countries if the eventual surplus payoff covers the to-
tal outside payoff options of these countries. Nevertheless, in this regard, the horizontal
equity-based transfer does not avoid free-riding for non-pivotal countries with outside
payoffs larger than the average initial payoffs. Obtaining a self-enforcing NAMAs coali-
tion facilitates international MRV both for funding and GHG reductions.
21See θ j(·) values when free-riding in table 2.
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Table 3: Transfer à la Weikard applied to illustrative example.
a
Parameter Country A Country B Country C Country D Total
Full cooperation
ti (XG,xi) 35.56 4.11 -30.24 -9.42 0.00
vi(XG,xi, ti) 0.00 0.00 3.24 0.64 3.89
Country A announces θ˜A(20) = 35.00
ti(XG,xi) 35.00 4.11 -29.78 -9.33 0.00
vi
[
(XG,xi, ti), t˜A
]
0.56 0.00 2.78 0.55 3.89
Country B announces θ˜B(20) = 24.00
ti(XG,xi) 35.56 3.11 -29.41 -9.26 0.00
vi
[
(XG,xi, ti), t˜B
]
0.00 1.00 2.41 0.48 3.89
Country B announces c˜B(xB) = 22.00
ti(XG,xi) 35.56 3.00 -29.32 -9.24 0.00
vi
[
(XG,xi, ti), t˜B
]
0.00 1.12 2.32 0.46 3.89
Country C announces θ˜C(20) = 4.50
ti(XG,xi) 35.56 4.11 -30.33 -9.34 0.00
vi
[
(XG,xi, ti), t˜C
]
0.00 0.00 3.33 0.56 3.89
Country C announces c˜C(xc) = 33.00
ti(XG,xi) 35.56 4.11 -30.41 -9.26 0.00
vi
[
(XG,xi, ti), t˜C
]
0.00 0.00 3.41 0.48 3.89
Country D announces θ˜D(20) = 0.45
ti(XG,xi) 35.56 4.11 -30.16 -9.51 0.00
vi
[
(XG,xi, ti), t˜D
]
0.00 0.00 3.16 0.73 3.89
Country D announces c˜D(xD) = 10.00
ti(XG,xi) 35.56 4.11 -29.69 -9.98 0.00
vi
[
(XG,xi, ti), t˜D
]
0.00 0.00 2.69 1.20 3.89
Notes:
a All figures are given in the same numeration (u).
Thirdly, these transfer schemes do not avoid asymmetric informational problems when
countries misrepresent either their mitigation costs or environmental gains from the NAMAs
portfolio. This result is in line with the Myerson-Sattertwhaite impossibility theorem:
there is not, in general, a mechanism (i.e., transfer) that it is efficient, balanced, individ-
ually rational and incentive compatible (i.e., that avoids asymmetric information). There-
fore, policy makers, depending on their priorities, have to choose between mechanisms
for avoiding asymmetric information and transfers that are efficient, balanced and indi-
vidually rational or monitoring to prevent misrepresentation.
Fourthly, the horizontal equity-based transfer scheme guarantees that every country
(either pivotal or non-pivotal) receives the same final payoff. The transfer à la Weikard
allocates transfers in a way which means that pivotal countries receive zero as a final
payoff and, thus, the surplus payoff is shared only among non-pivotal countries. Here,
policy makers have a trade-off if they assess the implementation of NAMAs under one of
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these transfer schemes, namely, simplicity and political acceptability against institutional
enforceability. If policy makers look rather for simplicity and political acceptability, then
they may choose the horizontal equity-based transfer scheme because it should be seen
as more pragmatic due to the fact that each country receives the same final payoff of
reducing GHG emissions. However, if the institutional enforceability of NAMAs is low
then some non-pivotal countries would free-ride. On the contrary, if policy makers are
more interested in the fact that NAMAs works as a “self-enforcing” agreement which
reduces the transaction cost of building strong institutions, they may favor the employment
of the transfer à la Weikard. Nevertheless, estimating the outside payoffs of countries
when free-riding would not be an easy task. In addition, the political acceptability of this
transfer for pivotal countries may be a problem, as these countries are the largest transfer
contributors and they receive zero as their final payoff.
Finally, we show our main theoretical findings by means of an illustrative example.
We find that, under some specific assumptions, the DCs undertaking a partially supported
NAMAs is the only one which has incentives to free-ride when the horizontal equity-based
transfer scheme is employed. This kind of country is characterized by having medium
GHG emission objectives and marginal abatement costs as well as middle-to-low envi-
ronmental gain from avoiding GHG emissions. This fact may suggest that if the horizon-
tal equity-based transfer scheme is employed to implement NAMAs, then NAMAs may
be focused, in a first instance, on DCs with the highest and lowest initial valuation (i.e.,
initial payoff) on the NAMAs portfolio.
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